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1 Introduction
Both the authorities responsible for applying competition rules and the regulatory authorities
for public accounts are frequently required to focus on the situation surrounding secondary
airports and the agreements that can tie in low-cost carriers (LCCs). Some agreements are
criticised as being excessively favourable to the companies in question. On this basis, there are
two emerging issues. This first issue stems from the competitive effects of these agreements.
Subsidies made available to LCCs can be considered as public aid. The latter should be notified
in order to ensure compliance with internal market operational rules. Within the framework of
the more economic approach implemented by the Commission, public aid can be authorised if
it addresses a failure identified in the market. Therefore, aid in itself is not prohibited, however
it must have been notified, and must not distort competition between airline carriers. Since the
early 2000s, the European Commission has established a number of formal procedures which
have resulted in the annulment of many agreements. These formal procedures are reflected by
the reclassification of potential support mechanisms to public aid and an injunction requiring
LCCs to repay funds received to the airport infrastructure manager 1.
The second problem is due to the budgetary impacts of these agreements. Secondary airports
in Europe are characterised by their operational deficits, often linked to structural overcapa-
city. Financial support given to airline carriers in a bid to generate traffic can effectively reduce
potential losses by covering variable costs and absorbing at least a portion of fixed costs. This
support may be noted by the rationality that would be that of private investors in a market eco-
nomy. An airport infrastructure manager can reasonably support an LCC on a sustainable basis
using reductions to aeronautical charges 2. However, this raises questions on the distribution of
relative gains. The contract between the airline carrier and the airport infrastructure manager
does not unite two actors with equal negotiating power. The LCC can obtain significantly re-
duced aeronautical charges which may raise concerns of distorted competition between carriers
(Malavolti and Marty [2010]), and also of collectively sub-optimal tax competition phenomena
(Malina [2012]). The difficulty primarily originates from the fact that secondary airports expe-
rience issues with overcapacity, and that opportunities for LCCs to trade-off between various
destinations place them in a monopsonistic situation 3. Agreements signed by airports and car-
riers can reflect this imbalance. For example, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Aviation Civile (Higher
1. This was the case in Nimes for Ryanair (SA.22961, e6.4m), in Pau for Ryanair (SA.22614, e2.4m) and
Transavia (e400,000).
2. In certain cases, the European Commission positioned itself in favour of the private investor in a market
economy. This was the case for Frankfurt Hahn and Ryanair (IP/08/956), and Saarbrücken Airport and Air Berlin
(IP/12/156).
3. In the framework of the OECD report on the analysis of strategic interactions between airline carriers
and airports [2009], Starkie explained that it is harder for an airport to use its market power if the latter is
over-capacitated, and if direct competition in the airport between airline carriers is low. Moreover, a report
by the Conseil Supérieur de l’Aviation (CSAC - High Council for Civil Aviation) released in 2017 on French
airport mergers estimated that relationships between carriers and low-traffic airports are characterised by ‘reverse
monopolies’ on the part of airline carriers.
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Council for Civil Aviation) [2017] notes the existence of marketing contracts, not only concerning
reductions in aeronautical charges, but also sharing of the airport’s commercial revenue 4.
Our work seeks to propose modelling in a two-sided market, enabling economic analysis of the
criterion of private investors in a market economy to be carried out. Airport income originates
from two areas : on one hand it is the product of aeronautical charges, and on the other of com-
mercial revenue (parking, subleasing of commercial spaces, etc.). This model was developed for
intermediation platforms (Rochet and Tirole [2003], [2006], Armstrong [2006], Hagiu and Wright
[2015], Verdier [2016]). A two-sided platform is characterised by the external network effects that
it generates between competitors. The presence of consumers on one side of the platform creates
value on the other, resulting in distortion of the tariff structure between the two sides beco-
ming potentially favourable in order to maximize revenues. Externalities can be bi-directional
or simply uni-directional. We apply this theoretical framework to airport infrastructures, in line
with an increasing amount of literature. Initial analyses of airports in terms of two-sided markets
were developed by Gillen [2011], Malavolti [2014], Ivaldi et al. [2015]. Gillen [2011] evidenced the
possibility of generating additional commercial revenue able to offset reductions in air tariffs,
enabling companies to increase the number of destinations serviced and therefore the number
of passengers using the infrastructure. The weight of non-aeronautical revenue in the economic
equilibrium of airports must not be overlooked. For example, in 2014, over 60% of airports de Pa-
ris’ profits were of a commercial nature. This percentage steadily grew between 2009 (54%) and
2014 (61%) (ADP, [2014]). Initial empirical analysis carried out in the United States by Ivaldi et
al. [2015] showed the existence of externalities between commercial and aeronautical activities,
justifying the adoption of a two-sided approach by airports. It is for this reason that we prefer
the two-sided approach as opposed to vertical integration when formalising the airport business
model. Criticism against adopting this approach for airports is mainly based on the fact that
externalities are only observed on each side of the model and do not intersect (see for example,
Fröhlich [2011]). However, recent developments in analysis of the two-sided approach reinforce
the model’s validity is low. Moreover, a report by the Conseil Supérieur de l’Aviation (CSAC
- High Council for Civil Aviation) released in 2017 on French airport mergers estimated that
relationships between carriers and low-traffic airports are characterised by ‘reverse monopolies’
on the part of airline carriers. 4. According to the CSAC, these contracts can be assimilated to
back margins imposed by large-scale distributors on small producers. In this respect, they inevi-
tably raise questions on vertical restrictions which will not be directly addressed in this paper for
the moment. See, for example, Rey [2003] for general economic analysis on vertical restrictions,
and Wright [2007] for an analysis of their impact on consumer welfare. Note that commercial air
transport sharing agreements may have beneficial effects as shown by Fu and Zhang [2010], as
4. According to the CSAC, these contracts can be assimilated to back margins imposed by large-scale distri-
butors on small producers. In this respect, they inevitably raise questions on vertical restrictions which will not
be directly addressed in this paper for the moment. See, for example, Rey [2003] for general economic analysis on
vertical restrictions, and Wright [2007] for an analysis of their impact on consumer welfare. Note that commercial
air transport sharing agreements may have beneficial effects as shown by Fu and Zhang [2010], as they internalise
demand effects. Nevertheless, they harm competition between companies.
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they internalise demand effects. Nevertheless, they harm competition between companies.
in the case of uni-directional externality (Hagiu and Wright [2015]). As such, the model
remains valid even if the decision made by passengers to travel is not unequivocally affected by
the commercial services offered by the airport.
Our model also seeks to provide a response to the issues posed by sectoral regulation. This
concerns investigating the impact that charge reductions have on the economic equilibrium of
the airport. In Europe, aeronautical charges are regulated by price caps 5. Secondary platforms
very rarely manage to balance their accounts (ECA [2014]) ; this problem is due to the fact that
the deficit is offset by public funds. It is therefore a matter of reconciling the infrastructure
operator’s optimal performance with minimisation of their deficit. Our model shows that ex-ante
regulation of aeronautical charges is not neutral in terms of the distribution of trading gains for
both contracting parties. While price cap regulations ensure that an airport in a monopolistic
position does not extort an excessive portion of airline carrier returns, they are unable to limit
the exercise of market power by companies in monopsonistic situations. If the market’s two-sided
nature makes it possible to offset lost profits on the aeronautical side via additional revenue on
the commercial side, then complete exoneration of the charges, or even negative charges, could
be considered 6. For example, this could take the form of commercial revenue-sharing with the
LCC. However, if this agreement results in a net gain for all contracting parties in relation to
the initial status, distribution between the LCC and the airport manager cannot be presumed.
Furthermore, charge reductions are offset by public resources. State aid is at stake whether it
goes directly to the LCC or whether it supports operational equilibrium of airport infrastructure.
As such, interdependence exists between the ex-ante regulation of aeronautical charges and the
ex-post monitoring of State aid intensity assessed by the competition authority. Therefore, we
aim to demonstrate the way in which ex-ante regulation modes (price caps or price floors) can
impact aid intensity assessed ex-post, as well as the distribution of contract gains between the
various actors, within the scope of this paper. Compliance of the support mechanism with the
European framework for State aid is assessed ex-post if the Market Economy Investor Principle
is at stake, and ex-ante by means of notification if State aid is at stake. In our model, we assume
that the support mechanism consists of a reduction to aeronautical charges 7. As such, everything
occurs as if the LCC were actually negotiating a comprehensive subsidy with the airport. This
is why we have simplified our analysis by considering that aid monitoring is focused on a ‘flat
rate’ subsidy.
Our work also facilitates understanding of the link between ex-ante charge regulations and
5. This regulation seeks to prevent the manager from potentially abusing its market power, resulting in principle
from their naturally monopolistic position. However, secondary airports do not retain such market power, to the
extent that they must leverage existing infrastructure, sustain destinations serviced in a context within which
airline carriers can easily arbitrate between several airports and represent the airport’s only client.
6. Furthermore, we have shown that the absence of charges on one side of a two-sided platform can be econo-
mically justified (see Malavolti and Marty [2013]).
7. Other support mechanisms exist, such as the co-financing of marketing campaigns, that we liken to this
mode in our analysis, for convenience.
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ex-post monitoring of State aid. It shows that one way to reduce aid intensity (and therefore
LCCs ability to acquire surplus) could be to establish charge regulations in the form of price
floors rather than price caps. In other words, the regulation of aeronautical charges in the form
of price floors in airports devoid of market power reduces the portion of surplus created by
the agreement and accumulated by LCCs. We have not carried out welfare analysis, but the
underlying idea is that the higher the surplus accumulated by the LCC, the greater the support
required for secondary airports to achieve operational equilibrium ; support via the injection of
public funds, costly in collective terms. In the next section, we will present the model and its
primary results. The last section discusses results obtained and sets out suggestions for future
research.












Our model considers airports as platforms that connect passengers with shops located in the
terminal. This interaction takes place via companies that bring traffic into the airport. As such,
aeronautical charges a , dependent on the number of passengers travelling with the airline, and
a price r, representing rental costs for commercial space, are fixed. The demand for transport
is expressed in the number of passengers, in line with the ticket price. Note that N(p), is the
demand for travel directed at airline carriers, where p is the ticket price paid per passenger.
Demand decreases in line with the ticket price and is maximal for a zero-priced ticket. In this case,
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it is worth N̄ . The aeronautical charge is proportional to this demand by calculation principle.
In addition, non-aeronautical activities are predominantly represented by the demand for rental
space inside the terminal (for shops) or outside the terminal (for car rentals). With S(r,N),
denoting demand, where S represents the number of spaces, it is a decreasing function of the
rental price r, and an increasing function of the number of passengers N , since they represent
potential customers for these shops or rentals 8.
We also assume that there are no cross effects of the price of rental and the number of
customers. Airport costs are composed of variable costs, essentially dependent on the number
of passengers in the terminal and denoted CV (N), increasing function of N ; and fixed costs,
denoted CF , corresponding to investments carried out (runway, terminal, car parks, commercial
buildings, etc.) designed to install production capacity for both aeronautical and non-aeronautical
services. As such, profit made by the airport structure can be expressed as follows :
Πairport = aN(p)− CV (N(p)) + rS(r,N(p))− CF
Where aN(p) represents aeronautical revenues, rS(r,N(p)), commercial revenues, CV (N(p)) +
CF , the airport’s total costs. Financially sustainable airports are, above all, airports with high
levels of activity (Paris Airports - ADP), Frankfurt Airport - Fraport, etc.). As such, by definition
these airports are not concerned by State aid-funded investments. This paper is interested in
airport platforms which are not profitable in view of low demand for services (passengers and
shops) combined with high fixed costs. As such, State aid is justified once variable profit is
positive, for example if we are in an area where variable costs are covered, but not fully fixed
costs. Therefore, the technical assumption corresponding to this scenario is as follows : the
airport’s profit is assumed to be negative even in the best possible case, i.e. for all possible
values and combinations of N(p), S, r and a, total profit is negative without additional aid.
A fixed amount, denoted A in our model, is therefore paid to the structure. This amount is
indirectly limited by the French Competition Authority in compliance with its guidelines and
decision-making practice. The LCC therefore calculates the maximum amount of aid that can
be accepted based on the latter, with Ā denoting this amount.
In addition, aeronautical charges paid by the airline carrier are regulated on the basis of a
theoretical natural monopoly situation. The regulator takes into account all airport revenue and
costs before setting a price floor, denoted ā 9.
8. We have chosen a positive externality exerted on shop revenues by passenger flows. A number of two-sided
models take into consideration externalities that cross over both sides of the market (video games, shopping
centres, newspapers, etc.). In the present case, it can be considered that shops also exert an externality on
passengers. However, as it is difficult to determine the sign of this externality, we can consider that the presence
of shops is desired by passengers. Consumers undoubtedly consider it preferable to wait in an airport with plenty
of shops. However, some studies show that waiting times could be extended due to the presence of shops, who
are prepared to pay higher rent if it means passengers spend longer in the airport. See for example Torres et
al., 2005 and Malavolti, 2014. With studies failing to conclude on a sign, we prefer not to consider externalities
exerted ex-ante on passengers by shops. On the other hand, results will be discussed according to the sign of this
externality.
9. The scope of regulation varies according to the size of the airport : as per ICAO guidelines (document
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In our analysis, the airport has one sole airline carrier as a client and is therefore considered
as economically dependent. The airline carrier will make the airport a take-or-leave offer 10 in
the form of a contract establishing (a, r, A), while also ensuring that it is in the airport’s interest
to accept the offer. For small secondary airports, activity is dependent on a contract provided
by a single airline carrier. As such, we envisage that the airport will accept the offer as long
as profit resulting from the agreement is non-negative 11. It can be considered that some of the
infrastructure’s fixed costs are irrecoverable and must be paid regardless of whether the airline
carrier offers the airport a contract or not. For example, this concerns taking account of fixed
costs relating to existing facilities (runway, terminal, etc.). On the other hand, a portion of the
fixed costs will only be pledged once the contract is accepted, such as fixed costs inherent to the
management of commercial spaces or in the creation of external car parks/upgrading them to
comply with standards. For simplicity, we have normalised irrecoverable fixed costs to 0.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of the relationship between an LCC and
an economically dependent airport, and to understand how ex-ante regulatory tools (maximum
aeronautical charges) and ex-post regulatory tools (operating aid) interact and influence decisions
made by economic actors. The application that we are proposing to study has the following form,
shown in Figure ??.
9082), small European airports generally adhere to single till regulation, while larger airports opt for dual till
regulation. Single till corresponds to a situation in which the scope of regulation includes all airport revenue. The
dual till principle corresponds to a situation in which only aeronautical revenue is included. Economic literature
became interested in this issue, reaching various conclusions. A first series of papers (Starkie [2001] ; Starkie and
Yarrow [2008]) carries out analysis on the impact of the type of regulation implemented on the airport’s long-term
objectives. By using a capital cost approach, the papers show that the airport’s investment incentives are reduced if
it is not able to retain sufficient resources. They therefore conclude that dual till regulation is preferable. However,
more recent papers (Fröhlich [2011] ; Malina et al. [2012] ; Malavolti [2014]) reach opposite conclusions when the
airport is considered as a platform. These studies recommend single till regulation in order to consider existing
externalities between both sides of the market ; aeronautical and commercial. Lastly, Perrot [2014] suggests that
for large airports, issues concerning congestion can justify dual till regulation. The consequence on the equilibrium
price structure as a result of positive externalities exerted by passengers on shops is that shops subsidise on airport
tax reductions, and therefore indirectly subsidise passengers. As such, at equilibrium, there are more passengers
in the airport, which increases congestion problems. As such, if the social costs of congestion are sufficiently high,
it may be preferable to regulate the airport using two separate tills.
10. By way of illustration, it should be noted that some airports conclude commercial profit-sharing contracts.
This is the case for Ryanair in France, who make sharing car parking revenue a condition of service launches
at certain airports. This is also the case in Tampa, Florida where the airport shares revenue from commercial
concessions with companies operating in its infrastructure. Fu et al. [2011] present this example in their paper on
the analysis of vertical relationships between airline carriers and airports.
11. 11. The profit that the airport can make outside of the transaction can also correspond to the possibility
to conclude a contract with another airline carrier. On this condition, the airport will choose the most attractive
contract among those proposed. However, these contracts can be uncertain or even non-existent. In any case,
State aid implicated in these contracts relates to start-up aid for new routes launched. We are focusing on aid for
potentially sustainable activity.
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Figure 1 – Timeline
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The airline carrier’s strategy is expressed as follows :
Max
{p,r,a,A}
ΠLCC = pN(p)−aN(p)− C(N(p))
s.t. Πairport = aN(p)− CV (N(p))− CF +A+ rS(r,N(p)) ≥ 0 (C1)
a ≤ ā (C2),
0 ≤A ≤ Ā (C3),
p ∈ R+,r ∈ R+, a ∈ R ,
pN(p) represents the airline carrier’s revenue from the sale of N plane tickets priced at p,
with aN(p) representing access costs to aeronautical services paid by the airline carrier to the
airport to handleN passengers. C(N(p)) corresponds to all variable costs supported by the airline
carrier when N passengers travel1 12. This is an increasing and convex function in N .Constraints
C2 et C3 represent regulatory constraints to be satisfied. The amount of aeronautical charges
retained a cannot exceed the price cap imposed by the regulator ā. However, nothing prevents
the aeronautical charges from being equivalent to a subsidy i.e a∗ < 0 at equilibrium if profit
optimisation leads to this. Operating aid A requested is necessarily positive and cannot exceed
the maximum level authorised by competition authorities. Constraint C1 represents the airport’s
participation constraint.
Proposition 1 At equilibrium, the LCC extracts all profit made by the airport with the help of
the operating aid requested, which is maximal.
Πairport = 0




Let the quadruplet solution to the maximisation programme (p∗, r∗, a∗, A∗) be such that C1(p∗, r∗, a∗, A∗) > 0.
So ã < a∗ is such that C1(p∗, r∗, ã, A∗) > 0 and such that ã satisfy the other constraints C2 et C3. The airline
carrier’s profit is therefore higher since only a is modified. ΠLCC(p∗, r∗, ã, A∗) > ΠLCC(p∗, r∗, a∗, A∗). This solution
is therefore preferable. As such, it is impossible to find a solution if constraint C1 does not reach optimum
saturation.
We further assume that A∗ < Ā, then C1(p∗, r∗, a∗, Ā) > C1(p∗, r∗, a∗, A∗) ≥ 0. It is therefore possible to
find ã < a∗ such that C1(p∗, r∗, ã, Ā) = C1(p∗, r∗, a∗, A∗) ≥ 0 which results in higher profits for the airline carrier.
ΠLCC(p
∗, r∗, ã, Ā) > ΠLCC(p
∗, r∗, a∗, A∗). To conclude, constraint C3is binding at equilibrium.
The result is robust since it does not depend on the form of the airline carrier or airport’s
profit functions, however the natural conditions required for convexity of the problem tell us
that the LCC has sufficient decision variables to extract all profit from the airport as a result of
the operating aid available to it. Above all, and in a more attractive way, this result highlights
interaction between ex-ante regulatory tools such as maximum aeronautical charges, and ex-
post regulatory tools such as the maximum amount of operating aid that can be requested.
More precisely, it appears that the aeronautical charges and State aid requested are substitute
instruments used by the airline carrier to satisfy the airport’s participation constraint. The higher
the amount of operating aid, the easier the participation constraint is to meet, while the airline
carrier’s profits do not change. Responsive to the amount of aeronautical charges requested since
it represents a direct cost, the airline carrier can use its market power to reduce charges, in turn
increasing its profit without modifying constraints. State aid will therefore be set at the maximum
amount. The airport’s participation constraint will be also be saturated, since without modifying
other maximisation arguments, it can be adjusted by the amount of aeronautical charges. It will
be set at the lowest possible amount in order to satisfy the airport’s participation constraint. As
such, it is perfectly conceivable that the programme’s optimum aeronautical charge is a subsidy
that the airport pays to the airline carrier in order to attract passengers ; future customers of
shops in the airport. Here, the two-sided structure is perfectly logical : this solution is only
conceivable if the variable portion of the airport’s profit is sufficiently significant in relation
to −CF + Ā. This variable portion is composed of aeronautical and commercial revenue. If
commercial revenue is sufficient, the airline carrier may therefore reduce aeronautical charges to
the same extent in order to increase its profit.
In the interests of clarity, we have modified the programme in order to optimise it in relation
to the number of passengers N . This is possible since by definition, the function N(p) is strictly
decreasing in p par définition. Furthermore, following Proposition 1, the airport’s participation
constraint enables optimal aeronautical charges to be set. As such, simply reinserting it into the




ΠLCC = p(N)N + rS(r,N) + Ā− CV (N)− CF − C(N)
s.t. CV (N) + CF − Ā− rS(r,N)− āN ≤ 0 (C2)
N ∈ R+,r ∈ R+ ,
The airline carrier’s objective function is not only composed of profit made from selling
airline tickets to passengers (p(N)N − C(N)),but also from the airport’s profit taken from the
aeronautical charges, since they are classed as a cost for the airline carrier (rS(r,N)−CV (N)−
CF ). The airline carrier incorporates the fact that it will request maximum State aid available in
order to facilitate acceptance of the offer it will make to the airport. Let the Lagrange multiplier
be µ ∈ R+ associated with the airline carrier’s programme maximisation constraint (C1)The
programme becomes a maximisation programme in Lagrangian form L(r,N) in which first-order
conditions are expressed as follows :
∂L
∂N = p(N
∗) +N∗ ∂p∂N −
∂C
∂N + (1 + µ
∗)(r∗ ∂S∂N )− (1 + µ
∗)∂CV∂N −µ
∗ā = 0 (CN1)
∂L
∂r = (1 + µ
∗)(r∗ ∂S∂r + S(r
∗, N∗)) = 0 (CN2)
µ∗(CV (N∗) + CF − Ā− r∗S(r∗, N∗)− āN∗) = 0 (CN3),
The condition (CN2) sets the rental price for commercial spaces at the monopoly price level.
For all µ ≥ 0, (CN2) is true iff r∗ ∂S∂r +S(r
∗, N∗) = 0. The airline carrier behaves as a monopoly,
as the airport would have done, vis-à-vis the shops. As such, we are presented with the standard
outcome of the airline carrier’s application of a margin rate in relation to marginal costs (zero
in our model), a margin rate which is all the more significant since sensitivity of demand for
commercial space in relation to the rental price is low, i.e. ∂S∂r In addition, the higher N
∗ is, the
higher r∗ will be too ; since demand for commercial space increases in line with the number of
passengers in the airport, a result of our two-sided model taking into account the externality
that aeronautical activity exerts on commercial activity 13.
The first condition (CN1) is composed of a first element p(N∗) +N∗ ∂p∂N corresponding to the
airline carrier’s profit maximisation condition if it were not in a dominant position. This condition
would determine the monopoly price for tickets sold to passengers. Several additional effects are
taken into account, including the airport’s marginal costs ∂CV∂N which will tend to reduce the
optimal number of passengers, considering the airport’s commercial profit which increases in line
with the number of passengers, (r∗ ∂S∂N ),and lastly, consideration of the constraint of aeronautical
charge regulation, which goes in the direction of reducing the passenger number at equilibrium
13. 13. Note that the solution r would have been the same if chosen freely by the airport, taking into consi-
deration both sides of the market, since it would have applied its monopoly power and therefore determined the
same rental price level for commercial space. See Malavolti [2014] for analysis of two-sided market impacts on
equilibrium price structure.
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if the constraint is not saturated (or more precisely, if the multiplier is non-zero at equilibrium,
i.e. µ∗ > 0).
These three conditions give a local maximum if the concavity of L is guaranteed (see Annex
A), which is the case for reasonable assumptions of demand and cost functions. In order to
illustrate these results, we will specify the model and clarify the solutions in order to comment
on their evolution in relation to relevant model parameters. Let inverse demand for tickets on
behalf of consumers be : p(N) = αN̄−αN . The price is zero when demand is maximal, i.e. equal
to N̄ .Demand is decreasing in line with price. Let demand for commercial space, decreasing in
line with the price of rental space and increasing in line with the number of passengers in the
following form beS(r,N) = βN−ρr+ S̄.Airline carrier and airport costs are assumed to increase
linearly in line with the number of passengers CV (N) = γN and C(N) = θN . We assume that
α > 0, β > 0, ρ > 0, γ > 0, θ > 0, N̄ > 0, S̄ > 0. First-order conditions give :
∂L
∂N
=− 2N∗α+ N̄α+ r∗β − γ − θ + µ∗(ā+ r∗β − γ) = 0 (CN1)
∂L
∂r
=(1 + µ∗)(S̄ +N∗β − 2r∗ρ) = 0 (CN2)
µ∗(γN∗ + CF − Ā− r∗(βN∗ − ρr∗ + S̄)− āN∗) = 0 (CN3),
The programme is concave under reasonable conditions shown in Annex A, and it therefore
allows a global maximum. Characterisation of this global maximum creates discussion, parti-
cularly regarding the constraint on maximum aeronautical charges. Aeronautical charges are a
parameter set by the regulator and imposed on the airline carrier. ā is capped in line with regu-
lation rules which take into consideration the airport’s incremental costs and market conditions.
We are particularly interested in the case where the authorised price cap is high enough so as not
to become a constraint for the airline carrier. This leaves the airline carrier with the opportunity
to select a charge that is potentially lower than the price cap, or even potentially negative (i.e.
an airport subsidy in its favour), in line with the model’s parameters (notably characteristics of
transportation service demand).
Proposition 2 If consumers are sufficiently sensitive to the ticket price α ≥ α = −S̄β+2(γ+θ)ρ
2N̄ρ
,
then the airline carrier is able to obtain a strictly lower access charge from the airport infrastruc-
ture manager than that of the cap imposed by the regulator (µ∗ = 0).
Furthermore, the higher the maximum State aid Ā is, the lower the optimal aeronautical
charges a∗ will be. If profit generated by commercial activity is sufficiently high, the optimal
charge even becomes a subsidy in favour of the LCC.
Preuve.
See annex B.
Passenger demand ultimately determines the airline carrier’s optimal strategy : if demand
is highly sensitive to the ticket price, then selecting a low price will have a significant effect on
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the number of passengers travelling. In order to balance its profit, the airline carrier lowers its
aeronautical charges in order to maintain its profit, since this reduces its costs 14. The airline
carrier may attract higher levels of traffic in the airport as a result of the low ticket price, and
therefore increase profit made from commercial activity. Furthermore, the greater the externality
exerted on commercial activity by passengers is (measured by the parameter β in our model), the
higher the commercial profit will be. At equilibrium, the higher the impact of the externality, the
higher the number of passengers transported at equilibrium. As such, the amount of aeronautical
charges retained can lead to subsidising of the LCC once the airport’s commercial profits are
high enough. This externality relates to the definition provided on the two-sided nature of airport
activity.
It should also be noted that it is possible to establish equivalence between the intensity
of the reduction obtained by the LCC and the support mechanism Ā. The airline carrier can
request an even greater reduction considering the potential gains linked with the agreement for
the airport and European competitive jurisprudence in terms of the framework for State aid. It
can negotiate significant reductions in charges from a strong position, enabling it to monopolise
a large portion of the gains, and which will result in higher amounts of aid. The regulation of
charges using price caps does not limit the extent to which charges can be reduced, and so neither
does it enable the amount of aid to be capped. As a result, both ex-ante and ex-post regulatory
instruments are linked. For example, the implementation of a floor price, i.e. a minimum value
for aeronautical charges, would enable the amount of support allocated to the infrastructure to
be reduced without changing equilibrium results. This would both limit the LCC’s capacity to
appropriate overall gains and reduce the amount of public funds required to finance the aid.
In other words, it may be preferable to cap the amount of aid that can be paid to an airport
manager devoid of market power by regulating aeronautical charges via a floor price.
It is impossible to carry out welfare analysis directly within the framework of our model since
objectives specific to each of the regulators have not been established. On the other hand, this
analysis can be simulated by comparing profits generated by the contract with investment made
by the airport manager when State aid is requested. If operation leverages resources, then we can
consider that investment of the support mechanism for the activity will have been profitable.
It is a matter of comparing profits made by the airline carrier and the airport to the value of
the State aid requested at equilibrium. According to Proposition 1, the airport makes no profit
and maximum aid has been requested, i.e. worth Ā. We must therefore ensure that
r∗S(r∗, N∗) + p(N∗)N∗ − C(N∗)− CV (N∗)− CF + Ā ≥ Ā
According to our specification, this means that the investment is profitable to the extent that
fixed costs are not too high. This is an altogether natural condition : if fixed costs are very high
despite significant support, the infrastructure will never be able to cover fixed costs as a result
of its activity. The upper threshold for acceptable fixed cost values constrains all acceptable
14. 14. The airline carrier cannot recover the airport’s total profit via the contract it proposes. Its best option
is therefore to reduce the airport’s portion of profit corresponding to the cost of aeronautical services.
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parameters. We must take α > α4 = 5β
2
4ρ , in other words, sensitivity to the demand for transport
in line with the ticket price, even higher than α.
Proposition 3 he support mechanism can be considered as a profitable investment as per the
private investor, as long as fixed costs are not excessive. The airline carrier’s profit is effectively
higher than the amount of State aid, making the investment profitable when :
CF ≤ C̄F = −S̄
2α(−5β2 + 4αρ) + (−N̄α+ γ + θ)(β2 + 12αρ)(S̄β − (−N̄α+ γ + θ)ρ)
(β2 − 4αρ)2






Our model illustrates the rationale for an airport infrastructure manager behaving as a private
investor in a market economy to grant operating aid to LCCs, support which, more importantly,
is sustainable. For this reason, it reinforces flexibility brought about by guidelines published in
2014 and would, in principle, justify reductions to aeronautical charges which would no lon-
ger be classed as transitory. Consideration of externalities between airports’ aeronautical and
non-aeronautical business segments enables aid transferred to LCCs to generate and sustain
destinations serviced (i.e. to increase passenger flows) to be ‘financed’ by additional revenue
generated by commercial activities (car parks, shops, etc.). As a result, a private investor in a
market economy may be willing to accept that not all their costs will be covered on this side, by
considering gains incurred on the other side. Drastic reductions in charges (virtually eliminated)
or even commercial revenue sharing clauses (in other words, negative aeronautical charges) can
therefore constitute economic defence on the basis of efficiency, even if they are perennial and
non-transitory.
Such agreements between secondary airport managers and airline carriers potentially enable
secondary airports to operate at equilibrium, or at the very least, to limit their operating deficit.
The exchange therefore results in a gain, which can be broken down into two parts. The first part
concerns territorial impacts (linked to improved access or better connectivity, for example.). The
second may lie in the saving of public resources required to offset the airport’s operational deficit.
Yet, thanks to being in a potentially monopsonistic position (observed in a number of regional
European airports), the LCC can confiscate a large portion of this surplus. This translates to
fewer public funds saved for the community. A solution would be to cap aid intensity, which
is what the Commission does ex-post via its decision-making practice. Another solution, as
highlighted in our work, would be to consider the equivalence between the intensity of airport
tax reductions and the intensity of the State aid required. Current regulation using price caps
is sensical for airports equipped with market power vis-à-vis airline carriers. It ensures that the
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latter do not abuse their position by extorting an excessive portion of operator surpluses for which
airports are essential facilities. This position does not apply to regional airports : they are in
competition with each other for LCCs. Demand aimed at the latter, particularly concerning the
leisure client segment, is very sensitive to price and less sensitive to the destinations it services.
Airport managers must guarantee the existence of serviced destinations in their infrastructure
at all costs, where costly public, non-reusable investments have been made ex-ante. Faced with
economic dependence aggravated by sunk costs, the LLC can implement a contractual hold-up
strategy 1linked to the demand for fixed aeronautical charges significantly below the price cap,
or at no charge at all if not a negative one (linked to commercial revenue sharing, co-financing
of marketing campaigns, etc.) Price cap regulations do not enable restriction of the amount of
aid required to offset the fact that the LCC appropriates any gains linked to the agreement to
be limited. They should, in principle, restrict the amount of aid transferred in the form of a
charge reduction. Yet, State aid is not always at stake if we consider cases where the terms of
the agreement satisfy the Market Economy Investor Principle . As such, we need to find a way to
limit the LCC’s capacity to take advantage of the airport’s dependence. Our model notes that the
gain it may appropriate increases in line with the extent of the externality exerted on commercial
activity by passengers. We have not carried out welfare analysis within the context of this paper ;
however, it could be considered that the collective cost of appropriation will increase in line with
the marginal costs of the public funds used. As such, we propose to cap the LCC’s capacity to
monopolise this gain by substituting ex-ante regulation of aeronautical charges via price caps
with price floors for airports devoid of market power. This would enable ex-ante limitation of aid
intensity.
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A A Concavity of the airline carrier’s programme
Conditions sufficient enough to obtain a maximum, if one exists, are dependent on the conca-
vity of L. The Lagrangian can be decomposed into various functions of which concavity ensures
an optimal solution is obtained. L is expressed as follows :
L = p(N)N −C(N)− aN + (1 + µ)(rS(r,N)−CV (N) + aN) + µ(ā− a)N + (1 + µ)(Ā−CF )
The first expression corresponds to profit made by the airline carrier p(N)N −C(N)− aN . This
profit is concave in N > 0 iff ∂
2ΠLCC
∂N2











pour N > 0
We will ensure sure that N 6= 0 at equilibrium. This condition is typically satisfied if passenger
demand p(N) is linear in N . Otherwise, the condition requires that if the effects of the price on
the second-order number of passengers are increasing, i.e. ∂
2p
∂N2
> 0,then the latter remain limited
in relation to first-order demand effects, in addition to convexity effects of airline carrier costs
which is aworking hypothesis of the model. The second expression corresponds to profit made
by the airport, multiplied by the multiplier µ ≥ 0 : (1 + µ)(rS(r,N)− CV (N) + aN).
As is the case for the airline carrier, the concavity of this programme is desirable in the

























pour r > 0
We will ensure sure that, at equilibrium r 6= 0 (CS1airport) is guaranteed as the airport’s variable
costs are convex, and the impact of the externality on the demand for rental space is decreasing
in line with the number of passengers in the airport. Returns from the positive externality are
assumed as decreasing for the sake of practicality. (CS1airport) is typically checked concerning
demand for space S(r,N) linear in r. Enfin, (CS3airport) Lastly, the condition (CS3) requires
checking. It is valid provided that the effect of the externality on the demand for rental space is
not too high in relation to the effects on costs and the direct effect on the price S(r,N). Finally,
the expression µ(ā − a)N + (1 + µ)(Ā − CF ) is linear in N , and therefore does not change the
concavity of the general programme.
To conclude, if conditions (CSLCC), (CS2airport) and (CS
3
airport) are satisfied,a local maximum
can be obtained. If conditions are strictly met, a global maximum can be obtained. The conditions












2 = −β2(1 + µ)− 4αρ (CS3)
for µ ≥ 0
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(CS1) < 0 and (CS2) < 0 for all α > 0 and ρ > 0 and µ ≥ 0. CS3 > 0 iff α ≥ α0 = (1+µ)β
2
4ρ .
B Proof of Proposition 2 :
First order conditions give :
∂L









µ∗(γN∗ + CF − Ā− r∗(βN∗ − ρr∗ + S̄)− āN∗) = 0 (CN3)
for µ∗ ≥ 0
A certain number of constraints need to be checked in order to correctly calibrate the model.
More specifically, we must also ensure that N∗ ≥ 0, N∗ ≤ N̄ , r∗ ≥ 0. Both cases should be
considered, depending on whether the constraint is saturated or not. Let’s assume tha µ∗ = 0
— N∗ ≥ 0 iff α ≥ α1 = −S̄β+2ρ(γ+θ)2N̄ρ ; with α1 > 0 if −S̄β + 2ρ(γ + θ) > 0.
— N∗ ≤ N̄ iff α ≥ α2 = −S̄β+2ρ(γ+θ)+N̄β
2
6N̄ρ
, α2 > 0 if α1 > 0.
— r∗ ≥ 0 iff α ≥ α3 = β(γ+θ)N̄β+2S̄ , with α3 > 0without additional conditions.
All constraints require a minimum α and as such, they are all compatible with each other. We
now need to determine the relevant lower boundary for α. We will compare α2 and α0. The sign
of their difference α2 − α0 is dependent on the sign (−2S̄β + N̄β2 + 4(γ + θ)ρ) which can be
decomposed into two elements, −S̄β+N̄β2+2(γ+θ)ρ) > 0 since α2 > 0 and −S̄β+2(γ+θ)ρ) > 0
if α1 > 0. As such, the sign of the difference is positive, i.e. α2 > α0. Equally, the sign of the
difference between α3 et α0 is dependent on the same condition and is therefore true for all
admissible α parameters. Comparison of thresholds α3 et α1 de même que des seuils α2 et α1
donne le même résultat : α1 > α3 and α1 > α2 on the condition that α1 > 0 and α2 > 0.
Therefore, imposing an additional condition to categorise α2 et α3. We define α = α1.
The constraint on aeronautical charges is not saturated if the price cap set by the regulator is
sufficiently high. This question cannot be fully answered without further setting of parameters.
However, a non-zero set of parameters exists, for which a∗ < ā. These parameters satisfy the
sufficient constraint at optimum :
−Ā+ CF + CV (N∗)− r∗S(r∗, N∗)
N∗
< ā
If the parameters satisfy this constraint, then it is not necessary to consider the case µ∗ > 0.
The solution for aeronautical charges is therefore a decreasing function of Ā, as shown in
the sign of the first derivative a∗ in relation to Ā. After calculation, the sign of the derivative is
dependent on the sign of the following expression S̄β+ 2ρ(N̄α− γ− θ). This sign is negative for
all α ≥ α.
The derivative of N∗ with respect to the externality parameter β is posotove provided that
α > α4 =
S̄(2S̄β+N̄β2−4(γ+θ)ρ
4N̄ρ(S̄+N̄β)
. This does not add further constraints since the sign of the difference
of α4 et α is dependent on (−2S̄β + N̄β2 + 4(γ + θ)ρ) dof which the negativity has been shown




C Proof of Proposition 3 :
In order to check operational profitability for the public investor, we need to check that the
airline carrier’s profit, to which we add the airport’s profit, is at best higher than Ā,denoting aid
transferred. We must therefore check that
r∗S(r∗, N∗) + p(N∗)N∗ − C(N∗)− CV (N∗)− CF ≥ 0
After calculations within the scope of our specification, the condition is dependent on the sign
of the following expression :
−CF (β2 − 4αρ)− S̄2α(−5β2 + 4αρ) + (−N̄α+ γ + θ)(β2 + 12αρ)(S̄β − (−N̄α+ γ + θ)ρ) ≥ 0
First of all, we must ensure that the expression is not negative for all possible parameters. The
first part represents fixed costs and is negative. The second part is dependent on parameter
values, and lastly, the third expression is a positive value for α ∈ [α, ᾱ]. As such, we are sure to
find a subset of parameters that strictly satisfies this inequality. A condition could be imposed
on the maximum value of fixed costs, for example.
CF ≤ C̄F = −S̄
2α(−5β2 + 4αρ) + (−N̄α+ γ + θ)(β2 + 12αρ)(S̄β − (−N̄α+ γ + θ)ρ)
(β2 − 4αρ)2
This threshold C̄F is positive iff
−S̄2α(−5β2 + 4αρ) + (−N̄α+ γ + θ)(β2 + 12αρ)(S̄β − (−N̄α+ γ + θ)ρ) > 0.
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